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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: OTR Requirements in Support of the 1290-d Program

1. On 1 March 1956 [redacted] and I met to discuss what training would be required in support of the 1290-d program. [redacted] emphasized the need for advance planning so that OTR can have the staff and courses ready to perform the training needed. I admitted the need for such planning but argued its impracticability. This memorandum lists most of the reasons advanced at that time and others which I may have failed to mention.

2. It is impossible to estimate the number of persons OTR may be asked to train in support of the 1290-d program. These are the reasons:

a. As of today eighteen country studies have been completed and have been approved by OCE; four are in process of analysis while an indeterminate number of other countries are to be studied. Assuming that we were able to plan accurately for the eighteen countries, the addition of other countries during the next year would invalidate our estimates.

b. As regards the eighteen countries, in several instances the recommendations are no more than a recognition and approval by OCE of current programs. In one country study there is a recommendation for a police training program; however, implementation depends upon acceptance of U.S. aid by a government which if not neutralist, is fearful of the political repercussions which might attend acceptance. In two countries non-CIA training missions are operating and negotiations are being conducted relative to the number of slots CIA will be granted. Until this has been determined, we won't know how many persons we will be required to furnish, nor what qualifications will be demanded by the operating organizations (one a university and one a Government agency). Although the 1290-d recommendations assign Agency responsibility for a portion of the program and the covert annex prepared in part by the Director defines the CIA role, the degree of CIA participation must be determined on a country-by-country basis as the agencies involved plan for implementation. This sounds as if

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NSC review

the 1290-d situation were chaotic. This isn't so. It is simply that CIA, ICA, Defense, and State aren't used to this kind of coordinated effort; and that it takes a bit of time to set up and oil the machinery for inter-agency implementation. Further, we are just getting under way. You can't talk of training requirements until you have established your T/O and staffed the mission. In two countries where projects have been approved and T/Os established, we are experiencing difficulty in finding qualified personnel. In one there are eight approved slots -- two are filled. In the other, there are six positions with three vacancies.

c. It is difficult for the area desks to furnish estimates of training requirements which will be sufficiently reliable to serve as a basis for sound planning. Opportunities for training foreign police often occur without notice and with little chance for planning, while plans for training are often nullified by a change in the political situation in the foreign country. As an example, rather elaborate plans had been made for police training in a South American country. They had to be abandoned when the

At this time one area Division

hopes to train 100 police in OTH facilities during 1956; however, the Division admits that the estimate is optimistic and that the number ultimately trained will probably fall much below this figure.

d. Any attempt to establish 1290-d training requirements as distinct from total police training requirements is futile. The 1290-d reports, upon acceptance, become annexes to the OCB country plan of operations. They are but segments of the U.S. programs in the concerned countries. It is true that Defense and ICA are supporting one another in presenting a 1290-d budget. This is necessary in their case because of the heavier burden of manpower and material levied upon them under 1290-d. While this may be feasible in fiscal planning, 1290-d can't be treated as an isolated aspect of operational planning.

e. In the 1290-d program, ICA is responsible for overall coordination and has been given the responsibility for overt police training. Both ICA and State have contracted with the International Association of Chiefs of Police for that organization to handle the selection and the scheduling of training for a maximum of 75 foreign police a year for three years. IACP has been using the following facilities:

(1) Schools of Police Administration

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(2) Police Training Institutes — Southern Police Institute, Delinquency Control Institute, Northwestern Traffic Institute

(3) Police Academies

(4) Police Departments (on-the-job training)

(5) U.S. Army Schools

(6)

At present there is no short-term police administrative training given in the U.S. ICA is negotiating with the University of Southern California for the establishment of an institute for training foreign police administrators. At this point it's not clear what training facilities will be utilized by or developed by ICA for overt police training. It is conceivable that CI type training (as opposed to trade-craft training) which has been given by OTR will be offered overtly under ICA sponsorship.

3. Police trainees will fall into two groups. The first will consist of U.S. policemen to whom we wish to give intelligence training, intelligence officers to whom we wish to give police training, and intelligence officers to whom we wish to give additional specialized training as a prelude to their assignment to a police mission. The second group will be comprised of foreign police brought to this country,  or to a third country for overt police, covert CI, or covert intelligence training. The preservation of U.S. prestige abroad demands that persons assigned to police missions under U.S. Government sponsorship be professionally qualified. However, the qualifications, as regards experience and education, will vary with the position held. The chief of such a mission should have had broad police administrative experience in addition to any academic qualifications which he may possess. In large missions there will be subordinate specialist positions which can be filled with CIA personnel, experienced in intelligence but lacking a police background. This office has arranged for police on-the-job training for a few CIA employees who are to be used in CI slots in ICA police missions. Our purpose has been to give our people some familiarity with police jargon, with U.S. police organization and operations. I have decided reservations as to the value of this training. The man acquires no more than a smattering of knowledge; he knows nothing as to the reasons responsible for what he has observed and is, therefore, unable to relate his knowledge to a foreign police situation. Some of our people will have the

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intelligence to recognize these limitations, some won't. I am also fearful that the person who has received this orientation may be looked upon as a police expert and may be used in that capacity when no more qualified person is available. Much of our problem stems from the practice of assigning desk personnel to police missions for no other reason than that they have done a headquarters tour and are ready for a field assignment. Although it might necessitate going outside the branch or area division, I believe that persons can be found within the Agency with police, FBI or CIC experience which would qualify them for a counter-subversive advisory slot.

4. The experienced police officers who become members of an ICA police mission are for the most part employed by ICA. They receive CIA security clearances and are made witting of our interest on a need-to-know basis. It was our hope that some of these men would be given enough Agency training to make them aware of our objectives and give them some appreciation of our problems. This would make for a better working relationship in the field. To date none of those men who have been employed by ICA and have been sent to the field has received more than Agency briefing. If the 1290-d program ever gets to a point where staffing isn't done on a crash basis, we may have the leisure to give some training; but the immediate outlook isn't hopeful.

5. We are completing a study of foreign police training in the U.S. Our figures will not be wholly accurate. We have attempted to draw a line between police (including internal security forces) and intelligence services. In many foreign countries the distinction is not clear cut; therefore, we have failed to include some police and may have included some intelligence personnel. However, since 1 January 1951, we have trained approximately 150 police at Agency expense. There were 35 in 1951; 17 in 1952; 8 in 1953; 29 in 1954; and 61 in 1955. Basically this training has been of three kinds: visits to police departments and inspections of facilities and operations; clandestine training conducted by OTR; training conducted [redacted]. Many of the trainees have received a combination of two or more of these kinds of training. 31% of the trainees have come from FE; 23% from WH; 20% from NEA; 16% from SK; and 8% from WL. This Agency sponsored training has had little if any relationship to the 1290-d program. The 1290-d study was not conceived until December 1954, and although three country studies were approved by OCB in June, the rest of the initial eighteen 1290-d studies were not approved until December 1955. It may be that the psychological impetus provided by the 1290-d planning was partially responsible for the larger number of police trained during 1955; or that the increase was occasioned by a growing awareness of

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the intelligence potential inherent in foreign police departments; or that it was simply the result of our filling more requests. To date 1290-d programming involves 8 FE countries, 5 MEA, 4 WH, and 1 SE. Implementation has progressed further in FE than in other areas. There are active police programs in six of the eight countries studied. Some were in existence before the study; some were established as a result of the 1290-d recommendations. Because of this increased activity one might feel justified in predicting that OTR would be required to handle a greater training load in this area. Such a prediction may be unwarranted. The U.S. advisory missions are making greater use of [redacted]

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peninsula and of the training facilities of the Philippine police. Increased use of these facilities may offset increased demand. There is a belief among some FE personnel familiar with the Agency program [redacted] that the quality of instruction is inferior to that found [redacted] and that our employment of young instructors detracts from the effectiveness of the program; that police with a number of years of experience tend to identify age with professional competence. Even though such criticism may be unjustified, if the belief is general among U.S. mission personnel, it will probably affect the degree to which [redacted] is used.

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